



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
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PEACE KEEPERS
and
WAR FIGHTERS:
SAME FORCE, DIFFERENT MINDSET



Submitted by:

LTC(P) WINN NOYES

16 MAY 1995

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Paragraph Statistics

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Sentence Statistics

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Long (> 30 words): 29

Passive voice: 16
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Word Statistics

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THE PROBLEM

The problem with using the same force for sequential combat¹ and peace keeping operations is not one of tasks and subtasks. It is a problem of changing required mindsets, desired automatic reactions and conditioned responses, with insufficient time and training for reorientation of the soldier who must accomplish the tasks. The required mental transition is significant.

Assessments of American servicemen's ability to conduct sequential combat and peace operations have, for the most part, analyzed their ability to do the various required tasks and sub-tasks. These studies have looked at everything but the heart of the matter. Granted, a soldier who can occupy and defend a battle position in mid to high intensity combat operations, certainly has the skills to occupy a peace keeping road block. Granted, an F-15 pilot who can fly high intensity counter air missions, can certainly fly peace keeping deny flight missions. If, however, these young warriors approach their missions with mismatched approaches and conditioned responses, both are likely to fail. The soldiers who attempt to defend their battle position with the restraint required for peace keeping, probably will be killed before they can react to the violent attack they receive. If pilots fly their deny flight mission with the same aggressive, quick reaction mind set that has just kept them alive during high intensity battle, they are likely to unintentionally and unnecessarily escalate the situation or

even worse, shoot down friendly aircraft in a confused situation.

THE APPROACHES AND CONDITIONED RESPONSES

The approaches required for combat and peace keeping are as different as night and day. One is the dynamic approach required of our servicemembers fighting and surviving at the farthest reaches of violence that humanity has the capacity to develop. The other approach is the one required when attempting to prevent and suppress violence. This approach is similar to the balance between restraint and action required of a city policeman walking his beat. He must maintain a balance between benevolence and force application to ensure he dominates the situation.

Success in each of these missions demands a set of preconditioned responses that are significantly different from each other. Combat requires the set that matches the Army FM 100-5 tenants of initiative, agility, depth, synchronization and the propensity for violent offensive action. Peace keeping requires the set that matches Army FM 100-23 and its dynamics of restraint, control of consent, control of the level of violence and maintenance of impartiality. Each set is different. The manuals are different, the tenants are different and the desired outcome is different. Each set must be carefully developed, honed and fine tuned through intensive training. Each is essential to survival and success. Neither can be developed overnight.

Combat Operations

The purpose of War is to compel your enemy, by force, to do your will.² The tenants of our current operational doctrine³ for combat operations are Initiative, Depth, Agility and above all, the Synchronization of every shred of available combat power at the decisive point and time to overwhelm and defeat our enemy. We focus all of our energy, means and mental processes to achieve this aim. We work hard to train our servicemen and hone our units to a fever pitch of preparation to aggressively and violently pounce on our enemies.

The essence of the modern American way of war is aggressive violence and overwhelming combat power. This is typified by the counter-ambush training we give to our infantry squads and tank platoons with its resultant preconditioned responses that carry over into company, battalion, brigade and higher operations. When ambushed they must attack violently and immediately into the face of the ambush with all the available firepower they can muster. If they can overwhelm the ambushers with combat power, they will break their ambush and chase off or kill the ambushers. Most importantly, they will survive to fight again. Counter ambush training is important because it helps instill the warrior spirit of violent, immediate overwhelming action required in all combat operations. This confident, aggressive attitude is the hall mark of a unit well trained

and prepared for combat operations.

In air to air combat, he who sees the other guy first, maneuvers fastest and gets the first good shot, almost always wins. We therefor train and drill our pilots in the aggressive tenants, reactions and conditioned responses that give them the edge in each of these areas. Success in every school, every exercise, and every evaluation our best pilots go through during their careers is determined by the skill and speed with which they apply these principles. In combat, our best pilots, like our best soldiers and sailors, will aggressively and violently attack and kill the enemy before they can react or even know we are there.

PEACE KEEPING

Peace keeping requires restraint, cool analysis and above all, calculated and careful reaction to a plethora of situations. The U.S. Army's new Doctrinal Manual lists the guiding principle as "Situational Dominance"⁴. Although the term is new to most servicemembers, this dynamic principle is what peace keeping forces must achieve and maintain. Situational Dominance is significantly different from Overwhelming Combat Power. Unfortunately this difference is one that is not universally understood.

The three dynamic variables that must be kept in balance for success in peace operations are the level of consent, control of the level of violence and the degree of impartiality. The sensitivity of these variables

significantly changes the environment from that of combat in several specific ways. Peace operations often take place in situations where even the most minor measures and actions may have immediate strategic consequences. The environment is one which often requires major decisions to be made by junior leaders. Peace operations require significant coordination with other government and non-government organizations. DCD may not be, and often is not, the lead agency in the operations.

Virtually every servicemember or civilian in the environment has the potential of upsetting the delicate balance of the variables required to maintain situational dominance. Their preconditioned responses to each situation must be in line with the restrained approach and principles of this specific mission.

In combat operations, consent is not an issue of concern for the military commander. In peace operations though, it is crucial. The very reason that the military forces are present for peace keeping is because the belligerents have agreed to them being there and the purpose of their presence. Maintenance of the consent requires a conscious effort by the entire chain of command and each servicemember. Determining the balance between benevolence and self defense is a constant chore for every leader in this environment.

An attitude of benevolence, coupled with the demonstrable strength and will to provide security and discipline must be projected and maintained. Much like the

severe impact a crooked police officer can have on a neighborhood, the perception of undisciplined and uncaring soldiers will destroy the balance they are trying to achieve. One or two minor acts of indiscipline or one significant act which catches media attention will quickly turn consent into resentment and rebellion. One minor act of theft or brutality can turn the public view of the peace keepers from one of benevolence to one of occupation forces. One mis-coordinated action resulting in the shooting of a friendly aircraft may have an irreversible impact. Failure to prevent brutality and enhance security can have the same impact. In short, the attitude of the peace keepers, as demonstrated by their discipline and actions, will determine the success of the commander's ability to maintain the consent required for the success of the mission.

Peace operations forces must control the level of violence and escalation. Restraint and absolute understanding of not only the what, but the why of the rules of engagement is mandatory for every peace keeping servicemember. Restraint must now override the conditioned response instilled in most warriors. In its place must be the restrained and calculating conditioned response of the peace keeper. If a young Sergeant, manning a UN checkpoint responds with overwhelming combat power to a sniper round fired in his general direction, his excessive response will most likely trigger an increase in escalation that may cause hostilities to resume. In a peace keeping environment, he

must first decide if the incoming round is really a direct threat, then he must apply his ROE and decide if he will respond, who or what he will respond against and the level of violence he will use in his response. Failure of this junior leader to understand this different environment and apply the different rules of engagement, will result in loss of control over the escalation and level of violence. His approach and conditioned responses must be significantly different from combat operations if the mission is to be successful.

Peace keeping operations must be conducted with an even handed and impartial approach. The peace keeping forces must not only act impartially, but must also be perceived as being impartial. Nothing can more quickly destroy the level of consent or lead to the resumption of hostilities than a perception that the peace keepers have taken sides. Conversely, a strong impression of impartiality increases the level of consent and significantly decreases the necessity for use of force.

Management of the partiality perception requires a constant and conscientious effort from the entire chain of command and each peace keeper. Again, junior leaders are in an environment where even minor decisions can have immediate and significant strategic impact. Again, the why of the local policies and rules must be clearly understood, not just the rules. Consider the young Sergeant in desert storm who is moving north with his unit and passes a group of starving refugees. In the combat environment he can throw them a

case of MREs and drive away with no strategic impact. If the same sergeant in a peace keeping environment gives a case of MREs to refugees, he may have just set a precedent that will have immediate and national strategic implications. He has shown partiality by feeding one faction and not the others. Depending on the negotiation skills of his commander, this incident could grow to epic proportions. It is the perfect World News Event for exploitation by any of the belligerent sides.

THE CHALLENGE

The end state of a successful peace operation is the relatively permanent resolution of a conflict that was facilitated by peace operations forces who were able to maintain situational dominance. The end state of a successful combat operation is an enemy who has been compelled to do our will by the overwhelming application of our combat power. The challenge is whether the same force can go sequentially from one mission to the other and make the required mental shift that will insure success and preclude unnecessary loss of life.

EXAMPLES

Recent training events and recent operations show that our servicemembers may be able to easily shift from peace operations to mid-intensity combat, but that going from a combat mindset to a peace keeping one, without some

retraining is exceptionally difficult. In fact, it is so difficult that whenever possible, the same force should not be used for sequential combat and peace keeping operations with significant retraining.

The change in mindset difficulty is easily demonstrated by a training scenario often run in Europe for troops preparing for peace keeping operations. Within 24 hours of the training unit moving into their initial lodgement area, in their new peace keeping mission area, a BRDM or other vehicle, that 24 hours ago was their declared enemy, drives within sight and range of the defensive perimeter of the lodgement area. This force is no longer a declared enemy, but is now one of the belligerent forces the peace keepers must separate and maintain situational dominance over. No obviously hostile intent is demonstrated and the belligerent forces are careful to insure none of the BRDM's weapons systems are pointed at the lodgement area. The soldiers from the BRDM dismount and mill around for a few minutes watching for a reaction from the lodgement area. If there is no reaction, one of the soldiers will fire one round from his individual weapon in the general direction of, but not specifically at any person or vehicle in the compound, normally well over their heads. All of them then jump in the BRDM and quickly leave.

This simple scenario is often an acid test of whether the American unit has made the mental transition in mission approach and conditioned response to be successful. The

desired response is the maintenance of situational dominance by careful, alert restraint and measured, controlled response to the level of threat. A well prepared peace keeping unit would go to heightened but restrained alert immediately when the BRDM appeared. The reaction force would be alerted, but would not move out. They would continue to watch, but not react to the BRDM unless he demonstrated hostile intent.

When the enemy soldier fired his round in the vicinity of the lodgement area, the young leader on the ground would have to determine if it was a hostile act. If he felt it was and his soldiers were in danger, then he should appropriately return fire at that enemy soldier with an appropriate level of force such as a machine gun. When the enemy jumps into their BRDM and leaves, he should cease fire and end the incident.

The reaction from a unit that has just completed a major combat operations training program, and not made the mental transition is almost always quite different, but very predictable. Occasionally, they will open fire with a tank main gun and destroy the BRDM as soon as it comes into view. If they allow the BRDM to continue, they will invariably open fire when the enemy soldier fires his round, killing all the enemy soldiers and destroying the BRDM.

Forty-eight hours ago, the BRDM was declared hostile just by being present. Now though, the rules for what is hostile and hostile intent have dramatically changed. So have the desired approach and conditioned responses of the peace keeping soldiers.

On 14 April 1994, two U.S. Air Force F-15s mistakenly shot down and destroyed two U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters operating in northern Iraq⁵. Twenty-six friendly people died. Irrespective of the many procedural errors by the various servicemembers involved, the mental approach and demonstrated conditioned responses of the two F-15 pilots were clearly mismatched to this mission and contributed significantly to the catastrophe. Major General Andrus⁶, the US Air Force investigation board president said in his conclusions that "OPC(Operation Provide Comfort) personnel did not receive consistent, comprehensive training to ensure they had a thorough understanding of the USJFMC directed ROE. As a result, some aircrews understanding of how the approved ROE should be applied, became over-simplified."

The "if it flies, it dies" approach these two pilots took to this mission and their response to two unknown helicopters showed the mind set that had made them successful in their combat training and careers so far. Like in the training mission above, it was precisely wrong for this peace keeping, deny flight mission. Restraint, positive identification of hostile aircraft and an evaluation of hostile intent were required. One quick pass and a partial identification is insufficient in an environment where unarmed helicopters from 4 different nations are constantly operating. Not only was the application of the ROE oversimplified and misunderstood, but so were the required approach and conditioned responses necessary for its

application.

Another telling training scenario often run for European units preparing for peace keeping missions is the car bomb incident. In this scenario, a car bomb explodes while an American patrol is going through a village. The villagers capture the suspected perpetrator and proceed to lynch him. If the American patrol has not made the mental transition from combat operations, their response will be confused and uncertain because this is a civil disturbance and doesn't fit into any of their conditioned responses. It is no direct threat to them so they will normally stand by and watch the lynch mob complete their objective and there by, inadvertently sanction the action. The strategic and political ramifications of their inaction can be horrendous. They have inadvertently violated the principles of impartiality, allowed escalation of violence, mob rule and will bring into question the consent of the belligerent parties.

If the American patrol has made the required mental transition and approaches this situation with the policeman like balance between restraint and action, their required response is clear. They will stop the lynching, capture the suspected perpetrator and turn him over to the legitimate authorities for proper legal disposition. No unnecessary force will be used, but sufficient force will be applied to insure the safety of the peace keepers and their situational dominance.

On the first day after our troop's recent landing on Haiti, the New York times front page story was an American Army patrol watching a Hatian policeman beat a civilian man to death for simply welcoming the "American liberators"⁷. Reading the article was like reading the script for a peace keeping training scenario where the soldiers had not yet made the required mental transition.

The requirement for a peacekeeping mindset does not only apply to the warriors. Captain Rockwood, a U.S. Army counter intelligence officer from the 10th Mountain Division was obviously unable to make the transition⁸. For two months before the Haiti landing he had been preparing for forced entry and military occupation. One of his specific tasks was to inspect the notorious Haitian prisons and stop the human rights violations. When the invasion force's mission changed to peace keeping, so did Captain Rockwood's⁹.

Department of Defense was no longer the lead agency for prison control and reform. Both the State Department and the Justice Department were working the issue. For Captain Rockwood to now enter the prisons without authority from the legitimate government would violate the sovereignty of the nation we were trying to support. He should have rightfully been concerned about the human rights abuses he knew were happening, but the mission required him to approach the problem and respond to it much differently than if he had been part of an occupation force. If he had understood the differences, he could have been of significant help in the

eventual resolution of the problem. However, unable or unwilling to understand the differences between the missions, Captain Rockwood, after being expressly ordered not to, climbed over the fence in his compound and presented himself with his personal weapon at the Hatian prison to complete what he personally interpreted as "Bill Clinton's mission." Forcing his way into the prison at gun point, he was only stopped when a member of the U.S. military attache's office arrived and talked him into unloading his weapon and obeying an order to leave the prison. His actions violated each of the peace keeping principles and could have easily threatened the overall success of the mission.

CONCLUSION

In 1993, Mr Boutros Boutros Gali¹⁰ made his famous statement that "Peace Keeping is not a mission for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it". Part of what drove him to make that statement was the realization that while military forces had all the skills and resources for these missions, their normal approach and the conditioned responses they were trained for were not conducive to good peace keeping. What was really needed was a military force with the approach and conditioned responses normally found in police forces.

The argument of whether or not peace keeping is a proper military function is long past. It is permanently added to our list of specified missions. Now, it is imperative that we do not simply add peace keeping as a lesser included list

of tasks, but formally address its distinct differences.

Peace Keeping requires an approach and set of conditioned responses that are much more like that of a policeman than those of our traditionally trained servicemembers. Our soldiers must be trained to peace keeping's specific requirements and given the time and opportunity to make the mental transition required for their success and survival before they are committed to the mission. Failure to do so will be as irresponsible as sending untrained recruits to their death in a pitched and violent high intensity battle. If sequential operations are necessary, change the force when you change the mission.

END NOTES

1. For the purpose of this paper, Combat and Combat Operations are defined as those military operations conducted against a declared enemy. These operations range across the conflict spectrum from high intensity warfare to some operations required for peace enforcement.
2. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) p.75.
3. U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5, (Washington, June 1993) pp.2-6 thru 2-12.
4. U.S. Department of the Army, Peace Operations, FM 100-23, (Washington, 8 April 1994) pp. 1-5 thru 1-8.
5. Vago Muradian, "Two services linked in grief once again," Army Times, 25 April 1994, p.3.
6. HQ, U.S. European Command, Aircraft Investigation Board Report, U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter 97-26000 and 88-26060. MG James G Andrus, USAF, Board President. 27 May 1994, Volumn 1 (executive summary).

7. John Kifner, "Pro-Aristide Protester is Beaten to Death in Street of Capital," New York Times, 21 September 1994, p.A1.
8. Francis X. Clines, "American Officer's Mission for Haitian Rights Backfires," New York Times, 12 May 1995, p.A1.
9. Haiti is significant to this article for several reasons. For a more thorough analysis, see appendix A.
10. Boutros Boutros Gali, "Empowering the United Nations", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pg 98-102.

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Appendix A

Significance of Haiti

Haiti is significant for several reasons. First, it was a joint operation. The soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division and all other forces that participated, are some of the best trained and best led servicemembers our nation has. Approximately 45% of their soldiers from 10th Mountain Division had participated in previous peace operations. Second, the mission our forces trained for changed three days before execution. For two months they had prepared for a forced entry and occupation of Haiti and were well prepared, both mentally and physically for combat operations. Three days before the invasion, their mission changed to peace keeping while the State Department and other governmental agencies facilitated the return of the legitimate government. Leaders at all levels spent those three precious days frantically retraining their servicemembers on the new rules of engagement and attempting to make the required mental transitions.

The success of the Haiti operation can be measured by the end state they achieved and by the limited number of improper incidents that occurred during the conduct of their difficult mission. However, the incidents that did occur, clearly point to the difficulties created when soldiers are required to make the mental transition from combat operations to peace keeping with insufficient time for retraining.

APPENDIX B

ARMY HELICOPTER SHOOT DOWN ARTICLES
AND DOCUMENTS

Army, Air Force again linked in grief

CRASH from page 3

have been flying so low that their combat identification signals — called Identified Friend or Foe (IFF), designed to protect against this type of disaster — could not be received by either an Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, which was patrolling the area, or by the attacking fighters.

■ The helicopters' identification systems may not have been functioning properly.

■ The controllers managing the fighters and the helicopters aboard the AWACS may have failed to tell each other that the aircraft were "friendly."

■ Because the helicopters were carrying large wing-mounted fuel tanks, they may have looked like Hinds, similar to the ones operated by the Iraqi military.


Precautions failed

Despite precautions designed to avoid such accidents, including an AWACS aircraft circling above, powerful radios and radars, and identification systems, two UH-60s carrying 15 Americans, two British, one French, three Turkish military officials and five Kurds were shot down. The helicopters were flying between Zakho, Iraq, and other Kurdish towns in northern Iraq to take the officials to meet with Kurdish officials.

The helicopters were attacked by the F-15s that were enforcing the northern no-fly zone, which was set up in 1991 by a U.N. resolution specifying that any Iraqi aircraft flying in northern Iraq above the 36th parallel would be shot down by allied planes.

The F-15 pilots made two visual inspections of the helicopters, concluded that both aircraft were Hinds and fired one missile each around 9:30 a.m. local time. Both aircraft crashed about 35 miles north of Irbil, Iraq.

One F-15 fired a radar-guided



AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, and the other an AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking missile. The fighters then flew to Incirlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey.

Reeling from the accident, the Army and Air Force launched an immediate investigation. President Clinton also pledged a full inquiry, and Perry took full responsibility for the disaster, which happened in broad daylight in clear weather.

"As the investigation unfolds, the results of that will be plowed back into the operation procedures to see that it doesn't happen again," said Army Lt. Gen. Richard Keller, the chief of staff of the U.S. European Command. Keller spoke in a telephone press briefing at the Pentagon April 14.

The Air Force will take the lead in the investigation, which will be conducted by U.S. European Command. The investigating team will

consist of F-15, UH-60 and E-3 experts; legal advisers; and British, French and Turkish officials. Tapes from the F-15s and the E-3 were being flown to Ramstein for analysis.

The Pope firestorm

On March 23, a few weeks before the Black Hawk incident, the debris of an F-16D Fighting Falcon sparked a firestorm in a parked C-141 StarLifter at Pope that left 23 Army paratroopers dead and more than 80 injured.

Ironically, the weather also was clear at Pope when the F-16 and a C-130 Hercules collided after the planes tried to land at the same time on the same runway.

Although both pilots from the F-16 ejected and the C-130 landed safely, the pilotless fighter hurtled into two parked C-141s and 500 paratroopers waiting for a practice jump, engulfing planes and soldiers alike in a huge fireball.

The Pope and the Iraq incidents will not push the services apart, Army and Air Force officials said, but bring them together by reminding them of the bonds they share. Of the April 14 incident, they said:

■ "It can be a life-or-death business [even] in peacetime, and we accept a certain amount of risk in this business," one Army lieutenant colonel said.

"There is a sympathy that is shared by all services across all boundaries. ... I don't think the Air Force is any less grieving than the Army or [anyone else], they are suffering as greatly as anybody," the officer said.

■ "Anytime military members lose their lives carrying out their assigned duties, every military member feels a loss," one Air Force major said. "We all know it could have easily been us."

■ "The Army and the Air Force have one common purpose

— to win America's war. ... It is unfortunate these things happen, and hopefully we can learn something from it to prevent it in the future," one Army major said.

■ "We train so hard to avoid this that sometimes it happens. It could be equipment," a fighter pilot, a major, said. "Every time you squeeze the trigger, you run the risk of that tragedy happening. It's stunning."

"It has been something we have had to live with; it is a terrible fact of war. Those planes are armed and going out there to enforce U.N. policies, they are not playing games, it is for real."

About the Pope accident, servicemen said:

■ "It wasn't the Air Force's fault; it wasn't the Army's fault. When it happened, everyone went out to help," said Army Sgt. Edmond Scarborough, 2d Battalion of the 606th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Fort Bragg near Fayetteville, N.C.

■ "The Army guys were the real heroes. The Army and the Air Force, we have a rivalry, you know. And it was amazing how we stuck together," said Airman 1st Class Donald Davis, a security police officer assigned to the gate at the Green Ramp at Pope.

■ "[The response effort at Pope] really cements the relationship between the 23d [Fighter Wing], the 82d [Airborne Division] and the 18th [Aviation Corps]. It's almost a partnership. This partnership allows us to train together and to go to war together. The relationship between the Army and the Air Force has never been stronger," said Army Col. John Schmader, commander of the 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg.

Staff writers G.W. Poindexter, Steven Watkins, Sean D. Naylor and Stephanie Kang contributed to this report.

Names of dead Americans held pending remains identification

By Bernard Adelsberger

Times staff writer

WASHINGTON — The names of the 15 Americans killed in the downing of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters over Iraq are being withheld until remains are identified, Army officials said.

Normally, identifications of soldiers killed in action or in an accident are released after surviving family members are notified. However, Army officials said additional precautions for identification would be taken in this case.

At least one victim was an Air Force officer, 2d Lt. Laura Ashley Piper, 25, of Venice, Fla., who was assigned to the 7454th Tactical Intelligence Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

The service members were among 26 victims aboard two UH-60 helicopters flying over Iraq. Also

among the victims were five Kurds, three Turks, two Britons and one Frenchman.

The helicopters were assigned to the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment from Giebelstadt, Germany, according to a spokeswoman for the U.S. European Command.

The bodies of the dead service members were expected to reach Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, April 18, according to a spokeswoman for V Corps in Frankfurt. From there they were to be transferred to a morgue in Frankfurt operated by the 21st Theater Army Area Command.

President Clinton, expressed "terrible sorrow" over the incident and ordered U.S. flags on public buildings throughout the nation to be flown at half-staff until April 25 as a "mark of respect for those who died."

Apache fuel mishap injures six soldiers

FORT HOOD, Texas —

Two Fort Hood pilots were engulfed in flames April 13 when their AH-64 Apache helicopter caught fire while refueling during a training exercise near here.

1st Lt. Eric L. Vickery, 26, and CW3 Boyd A. Tackett, 33, both from the 502d Aviation Brigade, 2d Armor Division, were treated for burns and taken to Brook Army Medical Center, San Antonio. Vickery is in stable condition and Tackett is listed in serious con-

dition, said officials here. Four other soldiers suffered minor injury.

The accident took place at Camp Bowie, 90 miles northwest of Fort Hood, which is regularly used for Apache training. The pilots were conducting a "hot refuel" when the fuel hose apparently broke free from the nozzle spraying fuel on the hot running engines, said a senior official here.

— Jon R. Anderson

This Week

THE BLACK HAWKS' DOWNING

Tragedy results despite intricate safety measures

By Sean D. Naylor
Times staff writer

WASHINGTON — The two Air Force F-15C Eagles that shot down a pair of Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in northern Iraq April 14 did so despite an array of safety precautions and procedures designed to prevent just that from happening.

These included a detailed mission rehearsal April 13; personal flights by the task force commander to verify the safety of his procedures for both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft; and high-tech identify Friend or Foe (IFF) gear, which should have told the jets that the helicopters were friendly.

U.S. officials were at a loss to explain why, despite these measures, the F-15 pilots still believed they were engaging the first Iraqi helicopter ever to penetrate that far north into the no-fly zone, and the first Iraqi aircraft to cross the 36th parallel that marks the southern border of the exclusion zone in over a year.

"There are half a dozen procedures we have in place," said Defense Secretary William Perry. "Any one of them, if they had been working, could have prevented this accident.... They didn't have to all operate. Just any one of them had to operate, and this accident would not have happened."

The helicopters were assigned to the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment based in Giebelstadt, said a spokesman for the U.S. European Command. The F-15s came from the 63rd Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base.

Coalition fighters had flown 27,000 sorties over northern Iraq in the three-year history of the no-fly zone, said Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, there had been 1,400 coalition helicopter flights in missions similar to that of April 14.

"Throughout, the same procedures were used, the same procedures that were essentially in place [April 14] when this tragic accident occurred," Shalikashvili said.


Role rehearsal

The aircrews of all Combined Task Force aircraft flying in northern Iraq at the time the helicopters were shot down had taken part the previous day in a detailed run-through of the mission, according to Lt. Gen. Richard Kel-


Comparing the Hind and the Black Hawk

The Iraqi Hind and the U.S. Black Hawk are not considered visually similar, but the downed American helicopters had wing-mounted fuel tanks similar to those on the Hind. However, the American helicopters are green while Iraqi helicopters are tan and green on top and light blue on the bottom.

Mi-24 Hind



UH-60 Black Hawk



SIZE:	70 ft. 6.5 in. long (incl. rotors)	64 ft. 10 in. long (incl. rotors)
	13 ft. 5 in. high	16 ft. 10 in. high
	5 ft. 7 in. wide	7 ft. 9 in. wide
SPEED:	183 mph	182 mph
MISSION:	Gunship with transport capability	Utility and transport

Source: Jane's All the World's Aircraft

ATPCO

ler, U.S. European Command chief of staff.

On April 13, this briefing was given to the crews of the 34 high-performance jets, one E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) early-warning radar plane and two Army Black Hawk helicopters that were involved in the following day's mission, he said.

"The day before, you would get all of the aircrews in there, you would brief the plan, you would indicate who was going to be where when, and you would discuss altitude, safety, frequency and all the things that would have you conduct a safe mission, and also sweep the no-fly zone to see if there had been any violations in there," Keller said.

He spoke April 14 via telephone to a roomful of reporters at the Pentagon.

Black Hawk flights to Kurdish villages occur on "probably half of the days of the month," Keller said, and the procedures typically vary little from mission to mission.

An Air Force AWACS plane, which can track every aircraft

across hundreds of miles of airspace, was in the air monitoring the no-fly zone when the incident occurred, Keller said.

"The U.S. fixed-wing aircraft were reported to be under positive control of the AWACS at the time of the incident, according to our initial reports," he said.

However, Shalikashvili said the fighter pilots were not required to await authorization to fire from the AWACS. He said the pilots were allowed to decide whether to fire on their own.

In addition, Keller noted, "Weather conditions were reported to be good," and the F-15 pilots visually identified the helicopters as Iraqi Hinds, making two passes, before engaging them.

While the Soviet-built Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter and the Black Hawk utility helicopter are not usually considered visually similar, an Army source said that when a Black Hawk is carrying external fuel tanks, as the two over northern Iraq were April 14, then "depending on the angle of identification, a Hind and a Black Hawk can look very similar from the rear."

However, the Black Hawks were painted dark green, according to a Pentagon press release, whereas Iraqi Hinds typically have a camouflage pattern of tan and olive green on top, with a light blue belly, said Washington-based military analyst David Ibbot.

Keller emphasized that the Black Hawks were visiting more than one village in northern Iraq, and would periodically land, thus dropping off the AWACS' radar screen while they were on the ground.

"It is not as if the Black Hawk is in the air the entire time," he said. "He may stop, do an hour or two-hour visit with the village, [then] come back up in the air."

When the Black Hawk takes off again, "The requirement would be that he should immediately make radio contact and squawk contact with the AWACS so that he's under positive control, and then continue his mission," he said.

Squawk contact refers to the coded messages sent out by the helicopters' IFF equipment. Each

See SAFETY next page

Two services, linked in grief — once again

By Vago Muradian
Times staff writer

WASHINGTON — Not again. For the second time within a month, the Air Force and the Army have been involved in a horrendous accident. The most recent one, April 14, claimed 28 lives — 15 of them Americans.

The first tragedy, at Pope Air Force Base near Fayetteville, N.C., March 23, killed 23 Army paratroopers and injured more than 80.

Thirty-eight U.S. service members died in the two incidents, nearly one quarter of the 146 killed in combat during the Persian Gulf War.

In the wake of the April 14 shooting down of two Army UH-60 Black Hawk transport helicopters by a pair of F-15C Eagle fighters, the services again plunged into mourning, while military and Pentagon officials launched yet another investigation into a mysterious tragedy.

Missions suspended

In response to the incident, Defense Secretary William Perry ordered a one-day suspension of fighter missions, which ended April 16, a Pentagon spokesman said.

Also, Perry said there was an immediate change made to procedures in the no-fly zone, although he would not give details of the change for security reasons.

The F-15 pilots thought they had shot down a pair of Iraqi Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters, according to senior military officials.

The accident most likely was caused by a failure to communicate by either verbal or electronic means, or by mechanical problems, analysts and military officials said. Here are some possible reasons for the failure:

- The Army helicopters may See CRASH page 32

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Human error behind Black Hawk

By Sean D. Naylor
Times staff writer

WASHINGTON — Poor command guidance and many instances of human error led two Air Force jets to shoot down a pair of Army Black Hawk helicopters over northern Iraq April 14, killing all 26 crewmen and passengers, the Defense Department has determined.

The official report of the European Command investigation into the accident reveals "a shocking number of instances where individuals failed to do their jobs properly," said Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Had everyone been doing their jobs properly, this tragic accident would not have happened."

Shalikashvili spoke at a July 13 Pentagon press conference to announce the investigation results. He was joined by Defense Secretary William Perry and Air Force Maj. Gen. James Andrus, commander, Third Air Force, who led the Accident Investigation Board.

Corrective measures

As a result of the many errors and misunderstandings revealed in the investigation, the Defense Department is taking steps to correct specific deficiencies identified in Operation Provide Comfort, and to improve command and control in joint air operations generally. Operation Provide Comfort is to protect Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein's regime.

The human errors uncovered by the investigation centered around the crew of the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, whose job it was to keep the jets and helicopters apprised of each other's movements. "If the AWACS had been operating properly, there would not have been the remotest possibility of this accident [happening]," Perry said.

The report states that even though the AWACS' Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system indicated that friendly aircraft were close to the F-15s as they prepared to open fire, "no one advised the F-15 pilots, warned the Black Hawks or otherwise tried to stop the engagement."

The report also faults the F-15C Eagle fighter pilots for misidentifying the helicopters as Iraqi Mi-24 Hinds. The Army Black Hawk crews appear to have escaped the worst of the blame for the accident.

Among the report's findings:

■ Since Operation Provide Comfort be-

A four-minute mystery

WASHINGTON — In a scene mildly reminiscent of the Watergate hearings 20 years ago, military officials are looking for four minutes of missing tape.

Two decades ago, congressional investigators were looking for 18½ minutes of missing tape that may have incriminated President Nixon in the Watergate scandal. This time, military investigators are looking for four minutes of videotape recorded by a camera inside the plane which could have shed more light on what the crew of an E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System plane was doing as two Army helicopters were being shot down by two Air Force fighters.

Although the camera taped everything the crew had done that day, the four minutes taken around the time of the shootdown are gone.

Air Force investigators are convinced

the tape was recorded over accidentally, but Defense Secretary William Perry said he remains mystified.

"This is a matter that must be reviewed further," Perry said at a July 18 press conference.

Perry also asked Gen. John Michael Loh, the commander of the Air Combat Command based at Langley Air Force Base near Hampton, Va., to review the matter further to determine whether "any administrative or disciplinary action is appropriate." Loh's command was responsible for the AWACS crew.

Despite the loss of the videotape, other data-recording devices allowed investigators to piece together what happened.

The camera aboard the AWACS plane generally is used to tape missions as a training aid, officials said.

— Vago Muradian

gan in 1991, helicopter and fixed-wing flights had developed into separate operations, without the close integration necessary to avoid such accidents. As a result, the fighter pilots were not even aware before take-off that there were Black Hawk flights scheduled that day.

■ The AWACS mission crew commander was not qualified in accordance with Air Force regulations and had flown only one sortie in the previous three months. The AWACS weapons controllers thus did not understand their responsibility to support helicopter flights from the Military Coordination Center in Zakhu, just inside Iraq's border with Turkey.

■ The F-15 pilots had not received recent, adequate visual recognition training that might have prevented them from misidentifying the Black Hawks as Iraqi Hinds. The lead pilot was even confused about whether the helicopters were Hinds or Mi-8 Hips, and had to refer to a recognition handbook in his cockpit while in flight.

Hinds and Hips are two of the most common Soviet military helicopters exported worldwide. The Army Black Hawk is the Army's premier transport helicopter, and the second most common aircraft in its inventory.

■ The IFF systems that should have alerted the F-15s to the Black Hawks' presence failed to do so. Investigators have failed to discover exactly why this occurred.

Whether any service members will be disciplined for their role in what Perry called "a tragedy that never should have happened" remains to be seen. The report is being forwarded to the commanders of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Air Force Air Combat Command and U.S. Army Europe so they can determine what, if any, disciplinary action is warranted in individual cases, Perry said.

Shalikashvili said neither he nor Perry could comment further on the possibility of disciplinary proceedings "without [risking] the fact, or the appearance, of improper command influence."

On June 26, Operation Provide Comfort commander Air Force Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Pilkington was relieved of his duties. However, Pentagon spokesman Air Force Maj. Tom LaRock declined to link Pilkington's relief to his role in the friendly fire incident, noting that the relief was an administrative action.

"An administrative action does not constitute disciplinary action or relief for See DOWNING page 6

Black Hawk downing: What failed, how to fix it

The investigation into the April 14 accidental shootdown of two Army Black Hawk helicopters by the Air Force over northern Iraq uncovered a myriad of command failures and errors in procedure that led to the tragedy.

Many were particular to Operation Provide Comfort and already have been corrected. Others were considered to extend beyond the operation to similar missions worldwide. Here are some major problems, along with the Pentagon's remedy for them.

■ **Problem:** Many personnel connected to the incident had a fuzzy view of their roles and the role of their organization in the Joint Task Force conducting Operation Provide Comfort.

■ **Remedy:** The Pentagon is directing its commanders in chief (CINCs) worldwide to

review their Joint Task Force operations to ensure they are conducted in accordance with published joint doctrine. All CINCs must establish a program of regular oversight of their Joint Task Force operations; and the Joint Staff will review the curricula at all relevant military schools to ensure organization, procedures and operations receive proper emphasis. In late July, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Shalikashvili will hold a conference of all the Joint Chiefs and CINCs to discuss actions being taken to prevent such accidents.

■ **Problem:** Fixed-wing and helicopter operations were not integrated properly, resulting in the F-15 pilots being unaware that Army Black Hawks were flying close to them.

■ **Remedy:** Shalikashvili has directed his

staff to write new doctrine for air operations between joint forces, to be completed by Oct. 5. It will be incorporated into all relevant training and operations.

■ **Problem:** The F-15s' Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) failed to alert the jet pilots that the helicopters they could see were friendly.

■ **Remedy:** Shalikashvili is directing the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to expedite their review of current IFF systems and to report to him by Sept. 30. In a July 7 memo to Defense Secretary William Perry, he requests the Pentagon work to ensure "aggressive technology development and acquisition actions to remedy this deficiency." Shalikashvili also recommends the services and CINCs re-emphasize training in the operation of IFF systems, and in their limitations.

Human error cited in copter downing

DOWNING from page 4

cause," he said. Pilkington was five months overdue to relinquish the position anyway, said LaRock, who added that Pilkington retained his position as commander of the 86th Fighter Wing at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

LaRock said it would be "inappropriate to speculate on the reasons for this administrative action."

"As with all other individuals associated with the accident, his performance will be reviewed by his commanders and any appropriate disciplinary action will be taken at that time," he said.

When interviewed by investigators, two AWACS personnel refused to answer any questions on the advice of their lawyers, and a third declined to answer "two or three questions," Andrus said.

He also addressed the fact that the four crucial minutes of the videotape taken inside the AWACS during the engagement were taped over by a crew member shortly after the incident.

"The board found no evidence indicating the tape-over was deliberate," Andrus said, adding that the service member who recorded over the tape "had not been part of the shootdown sequence."

However, Perry said he believed that the matter warranted further review, and had directed Air Force Gen. John Loh, chief of the Air Combat Command, "to determine whether any administrative or disciplinary action is appropriate."

This Week

Lead F-15

Says he 'was positive' he saw enemy copters; partly blames wingman

By Vago Muradian
Times staff writer

TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, Okla. — The lead pilot of the two Air Force F-15 fighters that shot down two Army helicopters over Iraq on April 14 said he thought he was being lured into an Iraqi trap.

Capt. Eric Wickson said he and his wingman, Lt. Col. Randy May, were certain that the downed UH-60 Black Hawks were Iraqi Hind helicopters.

Lawyers present defense Page 25

Wickson, from the 53rd Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, testified Oct. 19 at a pretrial hearing that was convened to determine whether five officers aboard an Airborne Warning and Control System, or AWACS, plane should be tried for dereliction of duty in the deaths of the 26 people aboard the helicopters, including an Air Force lieutenant. Wickson has been granted immunity in return for his testimony.

But May faces 26 counts of negligent homicide and two counts of dereliction of duty in the deaths and is scheduled to face a similar pretrial hearing beginning Nov. 7 at Sembach Air Base, Germany. Wickson also is expected to testify there.

In his testimony, Wickson said he and May both made mistakes.

He said he thought the helicopters were being used as a lure to set him and May up for an attack by Iraqi fighters.

Wickson said neither he nor May, who were flying out

of Incirlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey, was told that friendly aircraft would be operating in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq.

The encounter began when Wickson and May spotted something on their radars 50 miles away while flying at an altitude of about 27,000 feet.



If [Lt.] Col. May had any doubt on his mind then it was his responsibility to say something.

— **Capt. Eric Wickson**
Lead F-15C Eagle pilot



At about 11:22 a.m. local time Wickson locked his radar on a target 40 miles to the southeast and interrogated it with his Identification, Friend or Foe equipment, which should have gotten an automatic positive response from friendly aircraft. He received no reply, he said.

When the fighters reported the contacts, the AWACS crew reported that it had intermittent radar contact with something in the same area. Because the AWACS did not tell him anything else, Wickson said he assumed that the command plane also was unsure what the contacts were.

As the planes closed in on the helicopters, Wickson tried unsuccessfully to contact them with his IFF equipment six more times over the next eight minutes.

He said he used his IFF one final time "out of habit" to

confirm the identity of the helicopters before firing. He didn't use an encrypted frequency used by all aircraft in the no-fly zone because "I didn't have time," he said.

After seeing the helicopters, he vacillated between identifying them as Hind attack helicopters and Hip transports, according to testimony. After he checked an aircraft identification guide he felt certain they were Hinds. He said his conclusion was confirmed by May.

'Four eyes are better than two'

"I was positive I saw Hinds," he said. "But four eyes are better than two. ... I don't remember [May's] radio call, but he specifically confirmed they were Hinds."

Wickson fired first, downing the trailing helicopter with an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile. Seconds later May fired an AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking missile at the lead helicopter. After the shoot down, May said that he was not certain that the helicopters were Iraqi Hinds, Wickson testified. But he said May should have said something before opening fire.

"If [Lt.] Col. May had any doubt on his mind then it was his responsibility to say something," Wickson said. About 30 seconds after making what he and May thought was a positive visual identification of the helicopters, they shot down both aircraft. One hour after the shoot down, Wickson heard a call from the AWACS on the emergency frequency asking the helicopters to report their position.

"I became very nervous," Wickson said. "It gave me a very bad feeling; it was the first inking I got" that something was wrong. But in Turkey, their squadron mates surrounded Wickson and May and congratulated them on their victory. A few hours later the euphoria wore off. The two were kept in a room for five hours before they were officially told they had shot down friendly helicopters.

But they already had heard the news.

"We found out we had shot down Black Hawks from CNN," he said.


Unhappy about pay


Many military people want more survey says

So far, the Clinton administration has not earned many accolades for its proposals on military compensation. The administra-


In different worlds

More officers than NCOs are content, poll finds







MI-8 HIP




UH-60 BLACKHAWK



MI-24 HIND



UH-60 BLACKHAWK



APPENDIX C
CAPTAIN ROCKWOOD ARTICLES

Continued on Page A24, Column 4

American Officer's Mission For Haitian Rights Backfires

By FRANCIS X. CLINES

FORT DRUM, N.Y., May 11 — An Army officer who took the words of the nation's Commander in Chief to heart and went off on his own in search of human-rights violations among Haitian penitentiary inmates faced a court-martial today with his career and his conscience on the line.

A panel of five fellow officers sat in judgment of the odd, passionate case of Capt. Lawrence P. Rockwood, a fourth-generation military man who talked his way alone into the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince last year during the multinational Haitian incursion in a zealous and unauthorized search for abused political prisoners.

His one-man mission, intercepted before he could complete it, has ruined his 15-year career and left him facing a possible 10 years in prison. But as he took the stand this morning, the captain defended his belief in conscience, a belief that was bolstered, he emphasized, by his soldier-father, who took him as a boy to the Dachau concentration camp in Germany and taught him about the individual soldier's duty to human rights over rote obedience.

"He explained why these things exist in the world," Captain Rockwood told the tribunal here in a simple barracks courthouse.

"What happened there was the



Associated Press

Capt. Lawrence P. Rockwood at Fort Drum, N.Y., on Wednesday.

Continued on Page A24, Column 4

An Officer's Rights Mission Backfires

Continued From Page A1

result of cynicism and blind obedience," he said, speaking of Dachau. He justified his prison adventure by invoking international law and President Clinton's stated concern for "stopping brutal atrocities" as a main motive for the military intervention in Haiti that began Sept. 19.

Platoons of soldiers jogged past in orderly cadence this morning as the captain faced charges of leaving his assigned post and disobeying orders. In the view of the Army, Captain Rockwood was a military intelligence specialist on the loose in Haiti with a separate agenda and a loaded rifle when he scaled the fence of his base on the night of Sept. 30 and found his way to the national prison, announcing that he was there to inspect it for prisoner abuses.

Back at the base, his superiors in the 10th Mountain Division found a note on the captain's bunk. "I can no longer function in the U.S. forces," it read in part. "I'm going to do my job and you can court-martial my dead body."

Captain Rockwood's defense is that he heeded too well the words of Mr. Clinton. The 36-year-old officer said he acted on his own only after he was rebuffed in various attempts at going through the chain of command and found the military too preoccupied with protecting its own invasion force to attend properly to the human-rights abuses in Haiti.

"The chain of command had cowardly failed to carry out the primary objective of the Commander in Chief," the captain firmly insisted, saying he had to act. "I felt it was my duty."

Prosecution witnesses characterized the intense, articulate officer as "misdirected and dangerous" in shouting demands for human-rights investigations at superiors and "thumbing his nose" at the Army, as Capt. Charles Pede, the Army's trial counsel, put it.

"He said he was going to complete Bill Clinton's mission," Capt. John Gorley, a psychiatric nurse, testified as prosecution witnesses presented a picture of Capt. Rockwood as an obsessed, distraught officer.

The captain countered that he had carefully gathered intelligence information from a number of sources and was convinced that political prisoners faced torture and murder in the Port-au-Prince prison, long a target of criticism by human-rights monitors.

"I felt human life would be lost," he said, arguing that the Army was required to take action under international law. Hours before his prison adventure, the captain had accused his own command of dereliction in a written complaint to the Inspector General of the Army. It was "a career-terminating move," Captain Rockwood said.

The captain edged toward sarcasm in denouncing military officials and he bristled when Capt. Pede asked whether he claimed broad authority to selectively reject or re-interpret orders.

"I am personally responsible for carrying out international law," Capt. Rockwood replied. "That's the Nuremberg principle."

Under the Nuremberg Principles, established by the Allies after World

War II, a crime against world law can be subject to punishment, heads of state can be held responsible, and obeying orders does not exempt subordinates when there is the possibility of a moral choice.

The prosecution objected repeatedly to the attempts by the captain's lawyer, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, to focus on reports from international monitoring groups that the Port-au-Prince prison was notorious, with up to 85 percent of the inmates incarcerated for political opposition, not crimes.

The captain's certainty that the prison was the scene of torture and murder was not borne out by one defense witness, Col. Michael L. Sullivan, a military police officer who visited the prison on an authorized visit soon after Captain Rockwood. "I saw no signs of physical torture or abuse," the colonel declared while testifying that the living conditions

'I'm going to do my job and you can court-martial my dead body.'

were miserable and subhuman, like those in much of Haiti, and deserved the attention of relief agencies.

Captain Rockwood, insisted that throngs of political prisoners in Port-au-Prince were at heightened risk as Haiti's despotic de facto regime was on the verge of collapse, a point supported by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, a private advocacy group. To superiors' claims that no intelligence reports of prison abuse in Port-au-Prince were ever received, Captain Rockwood insisted that the Army never sought them out in the first place.

"I was aware that you are not allowed to walk on the grass to stop a rape," he said in an interview before he took the stand, referring to the Army's rules for actions soldiers could take against Haitians. He said at the time he rated the court-martial risk as negligible in the face of the obligation he sensed by law and family tradition.

The trial presented a crosscurrent of military and human values, with Mr. Clark's laconic, sharp-edged interrogation a counterpoise to all the terseness and crisp uniforms and endless "sirs" of the military witnesses. The presiding judge, Lieut. Col. Robert Newberry, showed an easy hand and wry demeanor. At one point he gently sought to establish a "vulgarity spectrum" of words rated bad by one witness to see if the defendant, hailed by friends as a dedicated and inoffensive believer in Buddha, could actually have used a traditional Army expletive in denouncing the high command.

The ghosts of old and new armies seemed on trial, too. Prosecution witnesses hailed Operation Uphold Democracy, the military name for the Haitian incursion, as a great success under difficult post-cold-war circumstances. But the defense invoked the history of World War II atrocities and the My Lai massacre in Vietnam as agonizing milestones

pointing to the primacy of Captain Rockwood's conscience under the conditions he sensed in Haiti.

Once he was inside the prison, the Haitian authorities summoned help from the United States Embassy. A military attaché, Maj. Roland S. Lane, told the court that he arrived to find a self-righteous and antagonistic captain holding a loaded weapon and "trying to take action into his own hands" during a "fragile" period of transition in Haiti.

"I thought, 'This could really turn out nasty,'" the major testified, adding that Captain Rockwood was "unstable" in fluctuating from calmness to shouting rages and demanding the right to check on prisoners' condition. The captain was eventually talked into unloading the weapon and obeying an order to leave the prison.

He was taken to an Army hospital for a psychiatric examination and was cleared as healthy. But was accused of leaving the hospital without authorization after he went back to his barracks.

"He's a soft person, a gentle person," Mr. Clark said in discussing the captain's excited state when confronting superiors. "He became upset because he knew if he was sent home his work would be severely damaged."

His commander, Lieut. Col. Frank Bragg, testified that Captain Rockwood was shouting and had a contemptuous attitude after he returned from the prison. Colonel Bragg said he repeatedly ordered the officer to be silent and "shut up," but the captain shouted, "I'm an American officer. I'm not a Nazi officer and I want a full accounting of human-rights abuses."

Captain Rockwood told the court what he meant was that, under international law, "there are limitations to military authority and I thought any educated officer realized that."

Contradicting the defense, Colonel Bragg said Army regulations specifically barred counterintelligence specialists like Captain Rockwood and himself from investigating possible prison atrocities. Major Lane said officials from the State Department and the Justice Department, not from the Army, had prison responsibilities in the Haiti operation.

Rather than worrying about human-rights abuses in prison, Colonel Bragg said, the defendant should have been worrying about protecting his fellow soldiers by tracing arms caches and "getting the bad guys off the streets."

Captain Rockwood's main goal lately has been obtaining the fullest possible hearing of his cause, for which he opposed prosecution attempts to drop one charge of conduct unbecoming an officer, a charge that his lawyers say is crucial to his ability to explain his motives and, if necessary, appeal to international forums for relief.

In his hospital examination a day after the prison visit, Captain Rockwood was found healthy by Major Dean Inouye, an Army psychiatrist, who said the captain lightly amended the words of Henry David Thoreau in commenting on his own behavior. "I usually march to the beat of a different drummer but yesterday I was probably a step out of beat."

Army officer says allegations influenced panel

FORT DRUM, N.Y. (AP) — A captain dismissed from the Army says a court-martial panel spared him prison time for making an unauthorized inspection of a Haitian prison to defuse his allegations against his superiors.

"They want this story and the allegations against their criminal negligence to go away," Capt. Lawrence Rockwood said Sunday after he was sentenced to dismissal. "By sending me to prison, those allegations would not go away. It was not their ideals that motivated them. It was their lack of moral courage."

The court-martial panel convicted the 15-year veteran late Saturday on four of five charges stemming from his Sept. 30 investigation of reported abuses at the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince.



Rockwood

Prosecutor Charles Pede, who had sought prison time, called the sentence "a fair result for the Army and the accused."

Rockwood, a 15-year veteran, said he planned to appeal.

"I am not relieved," he told reporters outside court. "The most serious penalty I was facing ... was dismissal. I am a soldier. It is my profession. It is my vocation, so I am not relieved by this sentence whatsoever."

The panel of five officers also ordered the loss of all pay and benefits, despite instructions from Chief Circuit Judge Lt. Col. Robert Newberry that Rockwood could lose only two-thirds of his pay if he wasn't sentenced to prison.

Maj. Gen. David Meade, commander of the 10th Mountain Division, will take up the discrepancy when he reviews the verdict. He can dismiss the verdict or reduce the penalty. The review could take several months.

APPENDIX D
HAITI ARTICLES

TON IS URGED NDON FIGHT ER HEALTH BILL

P. THREAT ON TRADE

me Democratic Backer
Medical Care Overhaul
eks Tactical Retreat

By ADAM CLYMER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 — Two Republican opponents of care legislation and one of its Democratic supporters today President Clinton to give up on the for the year.

wise, the Republicans — Bob the Senate minority leader, representative Newt Gingrich, city House minority leader — the President risked losing of his agenda, in particular a international trade agreement.

entative John D. Dingell, the an Democrat who has sought care change since 1955, of similar advice to the White

ite the warnings, Senator J. Mitchell of Maine, the mader, met again tonight with of a bipartisan Senate group k agreement on a bill that e coverage to more 40 million Americans ck with insurance.

after the one-hour meeting, did not end the talks. Mr. ell conceded that the attacks Republicans and from liberal s threatened their efforts. "I believe we should bring a bill faces certain defeat," he said. id it was now clear that they have to get the 60 votes needreak a filibuster and that they start counting those votes.

lier, the Administration ed aside warnings from the oliticans. Lorrie McHugh, the House spokeswoman on health said tonight: "The President is nitted to health care reform. As repeatedly said, he is encourCongress to come up with a bill and he will look at it."

other White House official said, actively: "We know what this is out. They want to be able to say democrats pulled the plug."

at the Administration very much s legislation for the trade agree to pass this fall. Although the would not die if approval was yed, Mr. Clinton has told foreign ers that the United States would n 1994 on the global trade agree t, which Republicans have ed since the 1980's.

representative Gingrich, of Geor and Senator Dole, of Kansas, the President at a White House

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HAITIAN POLICE CRUSH RALLY AS AMERICAN TROOPS WATCH

ARISTIDE PROTESTS

Exiled Leader Demands
U.S. Disarm Forces
of Military Junta

By JOHN H. CUSHMAN JR.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 — To the dismay of Haiti's exiled President, the Clinton Administration insisted today that American forces would not act as Haiti's police, despite the military leaders' repressive tactics against pro-democracy demonstrators.

The last-minute accord negotiated by Jimmy Carter, which left the Haitian military in place for the time being, forced the Pentagon to re-write its mission and put American troops in the odd position of cooperating with the very Haitian forces they had been planning to fight.

The exiled President, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, told the White House today that the United States should disarm the Haitian forces, who are endangering his supporters and American troops, Father Aristide's aides said. [Page A16.]

Mr. Aristide's general counsel, Jra Kurzban, said there was a risk that "we in the United States become an occupying army supporting the Haitian military, rather than a multinational force designed to assist in creating democracy."

The violence on the streets and the diplomatic wrangling between Father Aristide and the White House show the fragility of the arrangement in Haiti and the continuing risks even as American troops continue to pour ashore unopposed.

Despite the increasing concern over the possible repercussions, President Clinton said today that he was pleased with the way things were going.

"This is a very different and a much better day than it would have been had we not been able to successfully combine the credible threat of force with diplomacy," he said in introducing a White House briefing. "Our troops are working with full cooperation with the Haitian military. We should recognize that we are in a much stronger and safer position to achieve our goals in Haiti today."

In the face of brutal crowd-control tactics by Haitian police officers, Pentagon officials said that under the accord they had no choice but to

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A coconut vendor lay in the street yesterday after a Haitian police officer clubbed him to death near the docks of Port-au-Prince.

Despite Role as Negotiator, Carter Feels Unappreciated

By MAUREEN DOWD
Special to The New York Times

ATLANTA, Sept. 20 — Even now that he is helping make United States foreign policy, even now that he is stopping war on the wing, Jimmy Carter still gets that jilted feeling from the Clinton Administration.

And the worst of it is, he signals that he feels he is being treated shabbily by someone he brought into the State Department, Warren Christopher, a man he once called "the finest public servant I ever have known."

"Rosalynn and I have discussed this a lot. It means a lot to us," he said today, sitting in his office at the Carter Center with one worn loafer up on the glass coffee table, next to a walrus tusk, a cribbage board and a glass dove.

"We haven't come up with a solution to it," said Mr. Carter, 69 years old, in a rambling interview that touched on his role in negotiating a settlement last weekend with Haiti's military rulers, his poetry about the folly of war and his secret efforts to stop the Persian Gulf war.

He circled around but rarely used the name of Mr. Christopher. It was probably inevitable that there would

State, and the Secretary of State, who is back in Washington acting frustrated.

It was a telling sign on Saturday afternoon in Washington, when Mr. Christopher and his deputy, Strobe Talbott, showed up in a limousine to take a break at a late-afternoon showing of the Robert Redford movie, "Quiz Show," while Jimmy Carter was in Port-au-Prince struggling to negotiate a last-minute deal that would stop the planned invasion of Haiti.

Jimmy Carter should be basking in his moment of glory. (A CNN poll showed Mr. Carter getting 70 percent of the credit for the peaceful resolution, and President Clinton only 15 percent.) But the former President, as one friend puts it, is a man with "a Mission, capital M, and Moral force, capital M." And with a will of steel, he has forced a reluctant Clinton Administration to accept his help as a global facilitator and peacemaker.

Close friends of Mr. Carter say that he feels he is overdue for a Nobel Peace Prize after he failed to win one for his role in the Camp

JUNTA IN CONTROL

Pro-Aristide Protester
Is Beaten to Death in
Streets of Capital

By JOHN KIPNER
Special to The New York Times

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti, Sept. 20 — Club-wielding Haitian police officers waded into throngs of people welcoming United States troops today, beating one to death as frustrated American soldiers looked on.

By early afternoon of the second day of the American mission here, the police, the army and the sinister civilian "attachés" — the very Haitians that the American presence was supposed to remove from power — were back in control, riding through the streets in pickup trucks, brandishing riot sticks, lengths of iron pipe, branches ripped from trees and submachine guns, beating people at will.

As helicopters and cargo ships disgorged supplies for the American mission, and 10th Mountain Division soldiers stood guard at their new compounds at the port and airport, the police charged into the crowds around the docks, thrashing people in side streets, parks and even in front of the American Embassy offices.

"I'm disgusted," said one of three American soldiers posted atop a wall around the port, watching the police chase Haitians who had come to greet them.

"Two days ago we thought we were coming here to eradicate the police and the army," he went on, as his comrades nodded in agreement. "These people have a right to be free, they chose to be free. It's a shame, a shame."

Early this morning, thousands of Haitians began streaming out of shantytowns and slums and past the shuttered stores in the dilapidated downtown area. Growing in number as they merged, they headed to the port to see the Americans who had come to remove the military dictatorship and restore the country's elected President, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power.

"God bless you, God bless you!" they cried, blowing kisses to the helicopters sweeping in from aircraft carriers offshore.

But by midafternoon, they had been mostly scattered. A yellow school bus packed with Haitian soldiers in olive fatigues and escorted by a pickup truck carrying police officers and two men with clubs in civilian clothes, rolled by La Saline slum near the port with a loudspeaker blaring, "Everybody disperse immediately."

As reports of beatings of demonstrators and onlookers filtered into the American Embassy this afternoon, a spokesman said American troops would continue to adhere to what he described as a policy of "non-engagement in Haitian-on-Haitian violence."

The American buildup continued, even as its purpose seemed more unclear than ever, with some 3,300 troops moving into Port-au-Prince by midnight, a number that Col. Barry Willey, the Army spokesman, said would quickly double and then grow to about 16,000 over the next several days. Today, 1,800 Marines landed in Cap-Haitien, a port city in the north.

The troops' goal, as Colonel Willey

ule Styne, Bountiful Creator Song Favorites, Dies at 88

By ELEANOR BLAU

Iule Styne, the versatile, prolific songwriter whose tunes became standards for three generations and composer of such classic Broadway musicals as "Gypsy," "Gentle on My Mind" and "Funny Girl," died yesterday at Mount Sinai Hospital in Manhattan. He was 88 and lived in Manhattan.

The cause was heart failure, said Dr. Herz, his press representative. He had undergone open-heart

